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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. Whether or not appellants1 brief comports with the 
standards of the Utah Supreme Court. 
2. Whether or not Utah County Packing and Coles Brothers 
were necessary and indispensible parties to this action. 
3. Whether or not Utah County Packing and Coles Brothers 
were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
4. Whether or not Cheever had standing as an individual 
and guarantor to bring an action for rescission when any alleged 
fraud or damage was done to the principal, Utah County Packing, 
and Cheever, as president of Utah County Packing elected to 
affirm and ratify the contract. 
5. Whether or not Cheever, if he had standing, could as a 
guarantor with professional expertise inherent to the contract, 
inspect the property and still claim reliance upon the opinions 
of the seller. 
6. Were Cheever permitted standing, whether or not his 
allegation of mistake as to the trust deed failed to establish a 
sufficient basis for rescission. 
7. Whether respondents are entitled to attorney fees by 
reason of appellants1 initiating a frivolous appeal. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON S. CHEEVER, MARTHA 
T. CHEEVER, UTAH COUNTY 
PACKING COMPANY, INC., and 
COLES BROTHERS, INC., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, MYRA 
K. SEETHALER, and SECURITY 
TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
No. 20,362 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS/NATURE OF CASE 
This matter arises out of the sale of a meat packing 
business in Provo, Utah. The business and equipment were owned 
by Seethalers, a Utah corporation. The real property on which 
the business was located was owned by Joseph Seethaler and 
Myra Seethaler, husband and wife. In June of 1981, the real 
property and all of the stock of Seethalers was purchased by Utah 
County Packing Company and Coles Brothers, Inc., each of which 
were also Utah corporations. (R. 13, 18). As security for the 
transaction, Vernon S. Cheever, the President of Utah County 
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Packing Company, and Martha Cheever, his wife, executed a Trust 
Deed in the amount of $371,750.00 secured by a Trust Deed on 
their residence. (R. 28-31). (Appellant's Brief P.28-31). 
Soon after the sale of the plant, Vernon Cheever notifed Joe 
Sethaler and complained of the condition of the equipment sold. 
(R. 691-96). As president of Utah County Packing, Vernon Cheever 
achieved a compromise with Seethaler in the price of the accounts 
receivable to off-set the equipment failures (R. 642-45, 
697-98). Utah County Packing continued to operate the plant and 
by so doing affirmed the contract for sale* 
Utah County Packing Company and Coles Brothers, Inc., 
defaulted on their obligations and Mr. and Mrs. Seethaler, the 
beneficiaries under the Deed of Trust, proceeded to exercise 
their remedies provided under the Trust Deed. There was issued a 
Notice of Default and a Notice of Sale. (R. 32). 
The Cheevers filed this action seeking an injunction against 
the sale of their residence, and also affirmatively sought 
damages and other relief based upon fraud alleged to have 
incurred in the transaction. (R. 8-17). The Complaint attempted 
to allege fraud of two types. In the first cause of action, 
which sought reformation of the Trust Deed, the Cheevers appa-
rently claimed that their residence was to be security for the 
transaction only to the extent of $25,000.00, and that Mr. and 
3 
Mrs. Seethaler were somehow responsible for that misunderstand-
ing. The second cause of action, which sought to enjoin the 
sale, attempted to claim that Mr. and Mrs. Seethaler had fraudu-
lently misrepresented the quality of the various items of 
equipment used in the business and the earning power of the 
business itself. The original Complaint was filed June 28, 1983, 
(R. 8-17). 
On August 26, 1983, defendants moved the Court to dismiss 
plaintiff's Complaint based upon the fact that plaintiffs did not 
establish the necessary elements for a cause of action based upon 
fraud and also on the grounds that the plaintiffs allegation of a 
mutual mistake failed to provide a sufficient basis for the 
recision of any contracts. (R. 40). After the submission of 
briefs by both parties to the Court, the plaintiffs sought leave 
of Court to file an Amended Complaint. (R. 117) . Based upon 
stipulation of counsel, plaintiffs received permission from the 
Court on January 30, 1984, to attempt to amend their Complaint 
so as to adequately state a viable cause of action. (R. 190). 
Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved for a Partial Summary 
Judgment regarding the Notice of Default as it related to the 
Trust Deed. (R. 191). On February 14, 1984, the Court considered 
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and also consi-
dered defendants' Motion to Dismiss referred to above. Pursuant 
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to the submission of briefs and oral argument, the Court ordered 
that the plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed based upon the 
findings that the pleadings as did exist did not allege fraud or 
mutual mistake with particularity such that relief could be 
granted. The Court did, however, allow the plaintiff three days 
to file a Second Amended Complaint. (R. 239, 304). The plain-
tiffs did so file a Second Amended Complaint on February 17, 
1984. (R. 213). Subsequently, defendants moved once again to 
dismiss plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for plaintiffs' 
failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be 
granted. (R. 251). 
Subsequent to the receipt of briefs and the opportunity for 
oral arguments, the Court on March 30, 1984, granted the plain-
tiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ruling that the Notice 
of Default had not given proper notice to the trustors and thus 
was not a sufficient Notice of Default pursuant to the Utah Code 
Annotated. (R. 388). 
On March 26, 1984, counsel met with the Court in chambers 
and an informal discussion was held. The Court considered 
defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs' Second Amended Com-
plaint. The Court ruled that defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
was denied on the basis of the existence of an issue of fraud 
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that was properly pled. All of the plaintiffs other motions were 
denied. (R. 393)• 
On May 29, 1984, the case had been set for trial; however, 
counsel held a conference in chambers with the judge as to 
pre-trial matters that defendants felt may be dispositive of the 
case. Defendant Seethaler made a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint 
for failure to join Utah County Packing Company as a necessary 
and indispensible party. Because defendants1 motion, if granted, 
would preclude the necessity of a trial, the Court ordered the 
trial date stricken and allowed for the filing of briefs by both 
parties on the issue of whether or not Utah County Packing 
was a necessary and indispensible party. (R. 473). 
Oral arguments were scheduled for July 5, 1984, wherein the 
Court, after the submission of lengthy briefs, heard the argu-
ments of counsel, stated its inclination on the ruling, and took 
the defendants1 motion under advisement. (R. 601). On July 11, 
1984, the Court contacted counsel by conference call and further 
discussed defendants1 Motion to Dismiss. The Court ruled that 
the plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint be dismissed without 
prejudice for failure to join the necessary and indispensible 
party, Utah County Packing. The Court did, however, rule that 
the dismissal would not be effective for ten days in the event 
that the plaintiff could once again file an Amended Complaint, 
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this time for the purpose of joining Utah County Packing. On 
July 19, 1984, plaintiffs did indeed file a third Amended 
Complaint and added as plaintiffs, Utah County Packing (R. 516). 
Defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Seethaler subsequently moved for 
Summary Judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations 
had run as against the corporate plaintiffs, Utah County Packing 
and Coles Brothers, Inc., and also that the individual plaintiffs 
were estopped from electing a remedy contradictory to that which 
they had elected as corporate officers of Utah County Packing. 
(R. 580, 571). 
The plaintiffs basically conceded that the statute of 
limitations had run as to the corporate plaintiffs. After 
numerous memoranda and oral argument, the Trial Court granted 
defendants Seethalers1 Motion for Summary Judgment ruling that 
the statute of limitations had run on Utah County Packing; 
however, the Court once again allowed the plaintiffs to file 
further briefs as it related to the liability of the 
Seethalers. (R. 715) . 
On October 1, 1984, the Court held a hearing to give the 
plaintiffs the opportunity to present testimony to the Court and 
allow the Court to ask questions of counsel with their clients 
present. An open discussion between Court, counsel and parties 
then took place. The plaintiff, Cheever, was sworn in and 
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questioned by counsel. The Court ruled that it would take the 
matter under advisement. Subsequently, the Court met in chambers 
with counsel and indicated its inclination to grant the defen-
dants Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the theory that 
Cheever, as an individual, could not bring an action for fraud 
against the Seethalers in a separate capacity as an individual 
where he had affirmed the same transaction as a corporate officer 
of Utah County Packing. The Court indicated that it would 
reserve ruling and allow, once again, the plaintiffs to submit 
legal authority in an opportunity to persuade the Court not to 
grant defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Again after the consideration of numerous memoranda and oral 
argument, on November 5, 1984, the Court ruled that it found that 
undisputed facts established that there were no facts known to 
Utah County Packing, the principal, that were not known by 
Cheever, the surety. The Court further ruled that all facts 
which establish any alleged fraud were committed upon both the 
principal, Utah County Packing, and the surety, Cheever. The 
Court ruled that the principal, Utah County Packing, after 
discovering all the facts upon which it now complained, had 
ratified or affirmed the contract between the buyer and the 
seller (Utah County Packing and Seethaler, Inc.). The Court 
further found that under the facts and circumstances, that any 
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facts which may establish any alleged fraud were known or should 
have been known by all parties because the surety, Cheever, was 
also president of Utah County Packing, the party that had 
ratified the contract between the buyer, Utah County Packing, and 
the seller, Seethaler, Inc. The Court then found that the 
principal, Utah County Packing, having ratified the contract, 
had thereby waived any claim for fraud and that that election was 
binding on the surety. The Court further found that the surety 
who is and was the President of Utah County Packing was thereby 
estopped from asserting any claim for an alleged fraud, having 
made his election of remedies. The Court cited Utah case law as 
a basis for its decision. The Court further found that the 
plaintiffs1 Complaint did not state a cause of action for 
fraud and that the defendant had admitted that any claim by Utah 
County Packing is barred by the statute of limitations. The 
Court then granted defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R. 746, 747, 794-795). 
Subsequently, through a rather unusual Motion, the plaintiff 
objected to the Court's Ruling and Minute Entry. The plaintiff 
claimed surprise regarding the issue of whether or not Utah 
County Packing had ratified the contract. Notwithstanding 
defendants1 opposition to the form of plaintiffs1 objection, the 
Court once again granted leave to the plaintiffs to file a brief 
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and supporting affidavits relative to the question raised. 
(R. 787). 
Subsequent to the submission of memoranda, the Court heard 
oral argument on the matter on November 2, 1984. (R. 793). On 
December 5, 1984, the Court ruled that "matters presented by 
additional briefing have heretofore been considered and are 
adequately covered in the Court's ruling dated November 5, 1984. 
Accordingly the Court's ruling dated November 5, 1984, is deemed 
final." (R. 796). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah County Packing, Inc. and Coles Brothers, Inc. entered 
into an agreement with Seethaler, Inc. for the sale of a meat 
packing plant from Seethalers. Vernon Cheever, as President of 
Utah County Packing inspected the plant and executed the agree-
ment. Cheever, as an individual, provided additional security 
for the transaction and became a guarantor through signing an 
unambiguous Trust Deed Note for $371,750.00. Subsequently, Utah 
County Packing, through Cheever, complained to Seethaler about 
the condition of the equipment. Seethaler adjusted the price of 
the transaction and Utah County Packing continued doing business, 
and in so doing affirmed the contract. 
Vernon Cheever brought an action to rescind the Trust 
Deed and to allege fraud in the entire transaction. The trial 
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court, after prolonged argument and briefing, correctly ruled 
that Utah County Packing and Coles Brothers were necessary and 
indispensible parties to the action in that there were no facts 
known to Utah County Packing, the principal, that were not known 
by Cheever, the surety and that any action based upon alleged 
fraud belonged to the principal, who in this instance, chose to 
affirm the contract. Utah County Packing, having affirmed the 
contract, had thus waived a claim for fraud, which election was 
binding upon the guarantor. Vernon Cheever was therefore 
estopped from asserting any claim for fraud. Because the statute 
of limitations had run on the corporation, the Court correctly 
granted the defendant Seethalers1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
The Seethaler Corporation, a meat packing business, was sold 
to Utah County Packing Company, also a corporation. Prior to the 
sale, Joseph Seethaler took Vernon Cheever, President of Utah 
County Packing, on a tour of the plant facilities. Mr. Cheever 
was given the opportunity to see for himself and assess the 
equipment involved in the sale. An appraisal was also 
obtained. (R. 697-698) After agreeing upon a price, the parties 
decided that it would be necessary for Cheever to provide 
additional security for the transaction. Consequently, at the 
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closing, Cheever signed the documents as President of Utah County 
Packing and also signed, with his wife, a Trust Deed and Trust 
Deed Note offering their real estate as security. The amount of 
the Note, clearly set forth without ambiguity, was for 
$371,750.00. Mr. Cheever, formerly having done business as a 
realtor, could not have misunderstood the terms of the simple 
Trust Deed. (R. 28-31). 
Upon experiencing some difficulty with the machinery used at 
the meat packing plant, Mr. Cheever wrote a letter to 
Mr. Seethaler complaining of the equipment and sought damages in 
the form of a compromise on the sale price. After some negotia-
tion, there did indeed occur a settlement of sorts between 
Cheever, representing Utah County Packing and Seethaler in that 
the price of the plant was reduced. (R. 642-45, 697-98). 
Utah County Packing continued operation, never seeking to 
rescind the transaction. Eventually, Utah County Packing could 
not successfully operate the business and bankruptcy proceedings 
ensued. Seethaler, through Notice of Default, sought his remedy 
based upon the Trust Deed and Note. At that point, Vernon 
Cheever, as an individual, brought this action to attempt 
to enjoin any foreclosure and to rescind the Trust Deed and Note, 
claiming that he did not read the Trust Deed and claiming he was 
defrauded in the sale. 
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After numerous procedural battles, Seethaler brought to the 
Trial Court's attention the fact that the meat plant transaction 
involved Utah County Packing and Coles Brothers, Inc., and that 
Cheever, as an individual, merely provided additional security. 
Furthermore, Utah County Packing and Cheever, as an officer of 
the corporation, had affirmed and ratified the Contract and 
received the benefits thereof, and Cheever, as an individual 
could not bring an action for rescission, because the allegations 
related to fraud in the sale, if true, were properly to be 
brought by Utah County Packing. If Cheever, as an individual, 
had any allegations of fraud at all to assert, it could only be 
fraud as to the signing of the Trust Deed which was wholly 
unambiguous. The Trial Court was never compelled to even reach 
the questions of fact as to fraud allegations in the sale since 
the only parties entitled to assert such fraud, were Utah County 
Packing and Coles Brothers and they were barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
Notwithstanding appellant's brief, which gives a contrary 
impression, this case upon appeal is conceptually and proce-
durally very simple. 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF DOES NOT MEET THE STANDARDS 
SET FORTH BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND APPELLANTS' 
CASE, AS STATED, CANNOT PREVAIL UPON APPEAL. 
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Respondents respectfully submit that litigants filing briefs 
with the Supreme Court of Utah are under a duty to inform the 
Court of the facts, the nature of the proceeding below, the 
issues, the relevant law, to supply references to the trial 
record and to do more than superficially comply with the 
sub-heading requirements. 
Generally, respondents found appellants1 brief to be 
insufficient to adequately inform this Court of the nature of the 
case, the actual disputes, and the rulings of the lower court. 
Appellants1 arguments were unorganized, largely unsupported by 
law and respondents had difficulty in succinctly and completely 
addressing appellants' brief. 
Specifically, appellants failed to set forth the pertinent 
facts of the case. Appellants merely listed six facts which it 
attempted to prove before the lower court. The entire "Statement 
of the Case" was largely without reference to the trial record 
except for the multiple exhibits attached. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously addressed the problems 
which the structure of appellants1 brief presented. In Hobbs 
v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad, 677 P.2d 1128 (Utah 
1984), the appellants therein apparently cited only those facts 
which supported its claim to the exclusion of other material 
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facts supportive of the trial court's Decision. The Supreme 
Court ruled: 
In his presentation on appeal, the plaintiff 
has recited facts that support his claim of 
error to the exclusion of those properly 
admitted, material, and supportive of 
the trial court's decision. Axiomatically, 
we affirm the lower court in such event. 
[Emphasis added]. 
Respondents respectfully submit that the failure of the 
appellant to clearly present its case to the Supreme Court, as 
well as its failure to present the material facts upon which the 
Trial Court relied, and the failure to cite to the record 
constitute a situation wherein appellants' case as stated, is one 
which cannot prevail upon appeal. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT UTAH 
COUNTY PACKING AND COLES BROTHERS, INC. WERE 
NECESSARY AND INDISPENSIBLE PARTIES. 
As set forth above, the transaction in question upon appeal 
is the sale of a meat packing plant by Seethaler Corporation to 
Utah County Packing Company and Coles Brothers, Inc. The lawsuit 
was originally only initiated by Vernon Cheever, as an indivi-
dual. Respondents submit that there are at least two reasons for 
Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which require 
the joinder of necessary parties: 
Rules 19(a) and 17(a) both seek to protect 
the same interests: judicial economy and 
15 
fairness to the parties in litigation. The 
purpose of Rule 19(a), "which requires the 
joinder of indispensible parties as a 
condition to suit, is to guard against the 
entry of judgments which might prejudice the 
rights of such parties in their absence.11 
Sanpete County Water Conservancy District 
v. Price Water Users Association, Utah 652, 
P.2d 1302, 1306 (1982). In addition, by 
requiring joinder of necessary parties, Rule 
19(a) protects the interest of parties who 
are present by precluding multiple litigation 
and contradictory claims over the same 
subject matter as the original litiga-
tion. [Emphasis added]. 
Camp v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984). 
The Trial Court determined, by Order dated July 17, 1984, 
(R. 514-15) that Utah County Packing Company was a necessary and 
indispensable party to the action. One of the basis for that 
Ruling was that the cause of action for fraud, if any, belonged 
to the corporation, and not to the individual plaintiffs. A 
second basis for that ruling is that if Utah County Packing were 
not joined, Vernon Cheever could claim that the self-same acts by 
the defendants constituted fraud against Vernon Cheever indivi-
dually, but not against Vernon Cheever as President of Utah 
County Packing Company. This is precisely the type of "contra-
dictory claim" that Rule 19(a) was designed to prevent. 
"The plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option to 
elect to rescind the transaction and recover the purchase price 
or to affirm the transaction and recover damages." Dugan 
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v, Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). The defrauded party 
must make an election of remedies. Utah County Packing has 
clearly elected to affirm the contract. This is evidenced by the 
failure of Utah County Packing Company to bring a timely action 
for rescission, by the fact that Utah County Packing Company has 
made several payments on the Contract, and by the letter written 
to Joseph Seethaler. (R. 691-695, 642-45, 697-98). 
In addition to having elected to affirm the contract, Utah 
County Packing Company has waived any claim it may have had for 
damages. This is evidenced by the accord and satisfaction which 
was reached shortly after the sale (R. 642-45, 697-98), and by 
failing to bring a timely action for damages. 
Utah County Packing Company has, therefore, elected to 
affirm the Contract and has waived any claim for damages. Vernon 
Cheever sought, however, a directly contradictory result, that of 
rescission. The result would clearly have been inequitable, and 
Rule 19(a) prevents such a result. 
Where the existing plaintiff has failed to join other 
necessary plaintiffs, the entire case must be dismissed. Kent 
v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1984). 
The entire transaction, except for the Trust Deed Note, 
which Vernon Cheever signed personally and the Deed of Trust to 
the subject property signed by Mr. and Mrs. Cheever, was between 
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the corporations of Seethalers and Utah County Packing and 
Coles Brothers. Assuming, arguendo, that the fraud allegations 
made in plaintiffs1 Complaint were in fact made, they were not 
made to Vernon Cheever in his capacity as guarantor, they were 
made to the purchasers, Utah County Packing Company and Coles 
Brothers, Inc., and neither of those parties made any claim 
against the Seethalers based upon fraud. Vernon Cheever, 
therefore, as guarantor, cannot raise such an issue because he 
does not stand in the position of the debtor. The misconception 
of the plaintiff, Cheever, in this case concerns the right of 
subrogation. This right of subrogation would place the guaran-
tors, Cheever, in the place of the creditor were he required to 
pay off the debt of the debtor, Utah County Packing and Coles 
Brothers, Inc. There is no right for him to stand in the 
position of the debtor. The guarantors right against the 
creditor is based entirely upon the terms of the agreement of the 
guaranty and nothing more. 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty, § 127, 
Page 1135 (1968). 
The law does impose an obligation upon the creditor 
(Seethalers), to do nothing that would impair the security which 
has been taken for the debt. The Courts have even gone so far as 
to give the guarantor an independent right of action to force the 
creditor to seek the security that has been given before relying 
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on the guaranty; however, none of the rights given to the 
guarantor include the right of substituting himself in the 
position of the debtor. There is absolutely no authority for the 
guarantor to be subrogated to the position of the debtor and, 
consequently, unless the debtor raises the appropriate issues, 
the guarantor cannot. 
This is not to say that the guarantor would not have a right 
of action independently for fraud if he were induced to enter 
into an agreement of guaranty based upon fraudulent misrepre-
sentations to him. However, that type of fraud would relate to 
intrinsic fraud within the instrument. There must be independent 
fraud affecting the guarantor separate and apart from the 
contention of fraud which the debtor could raise but does not. 
For example, if the purported guarantor was imposed upon to sign 
a paper which he never intended to sign or did not know his 
signature was being affixed to the loan guaranty agreement, 
there would be no contract, regardless of whether the lender was 
a party to obtaining the signature or whether the lender was 
negligent in not checking with the purported guarantor before 
advancing the money to the borrower. First National Bank of 
Grand Junction v. Osborne, 28 Utah 2d. 392, 503 P.2d 440 (1972). 
The Trial Court was correct in ruling that Utah County 
Packing and Coles Brothers were necessary and indispensible 
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parties to this action in that the thrust of plaintiffs1 allega-
tions were allegations concerning damages done to Utah County 
Packing and not to Vernon Cheever as an individual, and in that 
Vernon Cheever1s claims as an individual were contradictory to 
his actions as a corporate officer of Utah County Packing. 
POINT III 
AS CONCEDED BY APPELLANTS, ANY ACTION BY UTAH 
COUNTY PACKING AND COLES BROTHERS, INC. WAS BARRED 
BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (1953 as amended) provides for a 
three-year statute of limitations for actions for relief on the 
ground of fraud or mistake, and also provides that "the cause of 
action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the 
discovery by the agrieved party of the facts constituting the 
fraud or mistake.11 The corporation plaintiffs filed their 
Complaint on July 19, 1984. The crucial issue with respect to 
the statute of limitations is, therefore, whether they discovered 
the facts, which are the basis for their claim before July 19, 
1981. The uncontroverted evidence in this matter establishes, as 
a matter of law, that the corporate plaintiffs did discover the 
facts upon which their claim is based before July 19, 1981, and 
their causes of action are, therefore, barred. 
As is evidenced by the Affidavit of Joseph Seethaler, 
(R. 642-45, 697-98), on or before June 18, 1981, Mr. Cheever, 
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President of Utah County Packing, contacted Mr. Seethaler with 
respect to certain alleged defects in equipment. Mr. Seethaler 
disputed that the equipment was defective, but agreed to make an 
adjustment of approximately $1,200.00 in the price of the 
accounts receivables, which Utah County Packing was purchasing at 
that time. (R. 642-45, 697-98). 
Subsequently, on or about August 19, 1981, Utah County 
Packing Company sent a letter to Mr. Seethaler detailing certain 
alleged defects in the equipment. Although the letter indicates 
that some of the repairs were performed after July 19, 1981, the 
letter clearly sets forth that all of the alleged defects were 
known or should have been known prior to July 19, 1981. 
(R. 691-96). 
As set forth in the statute, the crucial part in this matter 
is not when Mr. Cheever, as President of Utah County Packing 
Company, decided that he had been defrauded, but rather it is 
when he discovered the facts upon which he finally based his 
conclusion. The uncontroverted evidence in this matter clearly 
indicates that he discovered the facts upon which his claim is 
based prior to July 19, 1981, and the claim is, therefore, 
barred. 
Coles Brothers, Inc. was a partner of Utah County Packing in 
this transaction, and the knowledge which was gained by Utah 
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County Packing Company must, therefore, be imputed to Coles 
Brothers, Inc. Further, the letter is signed by 0. Kent Coles, 
who was the Vice-President and Director of Coles Brothers, Inc. 
The Trial Court ruled that Utah County Packing Company was a 
necessary and indispensible party to Cheevers' cause of action 
for fraud. Utah County Packing Companys' cause of action for 
fraud was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and 
Utah County Packing Company was, therefore, never effectively 
joined in the action. It thus followed that Cheevers' cause of 
action for fraud had to be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure 
to join a necessary and indispensible party. 
Appellants1 claim in their brief that it is anomalous for 
Seethalers to first claim that Utah County Packing must be joined 
in the action, and to then claim that Utah County Packing 
Company's action must be dismissed. There is nothing anomalous 
about this situation. The only anomaly would be if the result 
advocated by appellant were to be obtained. 
As is evidenced by the Affidavit of Vernon Cheever, dated 
August 24, 1984, (R. 697-98), Utah County Packing Company compro-
mised all claims it had for defective equipment against 
Mr. Seethaler. Further, Utah County Packing continued to operate 
the business after it knew or should have known of any fraud on 
the part of Mr. Seethaler, and thereby waived any claim for fraud 
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and accepted and ratified the Contract. Finally, Utah County 
Packing has also waived its claims for fraud by failure to assert 
them within the applicable limitations. 
Where Utah County Packing Company has accepted the benefits 
of the transaction and has waived any claims it may have had for 
fraud, it would certainly be anomalous for Mr. Cheever, the 
President of Utah County Packing Company, to now come in and 
assert a contrary position. 
POINT IV 
CHEEVER, AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND GUARANTOR, HAD NO 
STANDING TO BRING AN ACTION FOR RESCISSION WHEN ANY 
ALLEGED DAMAGE WAS DONE TO UTAH COUNTY PACKING/COLES 
BROTHERS AND CHEEVER, AS PRESIDENT OF UTAH COUNTY 
PACKING ELECTED TO SEEK DAMAGES, AND THROUGH 
COMPROMISE TO AFFIRM AND RATIFY THE CONTRACT. 
At the risk of redundancy, respondents respectfully submit 
that Vernon Cheever was without standing to bring the cause of 
action as a personal guarantor of the purchase agreement. With 
regard to defenses available to the guarcintor in determining the 
validity of the guaranty agreement, 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty, 
§ 52 (1968), is instructive: 
If the principal obligation is not void 
. . . but is merely unenforceable against the 
debtor because of some matter of defense 
which is personal to the debtor, the guaran-
tor may not successfully set up this matter 
to defeat an action by the creditor or 
obligee seeking to hold the guarantor liable 
on the contract of guaranty. Accordingly, 
the guarantor may not successfully defend 
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an action brought on the contract of guaranty 
on the basis that the principal obliga-
tion was obtained through fraud practiced on 
the debtor. . . 
See also Vickers v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 158 Ga. App. 434, 280 
S.E.2d 842 (1981) (a guarantor may assert all defenses, with the 
exception of personal defenses available to the principal). 
A claim that entry into contract was induced by fraud makes 
the contract voidable, not void. Pinkis v. Network Cinema 
Corp., 9 Wash. App. 337, 512 P.2d. 751 (1973); see also State 
v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944), appeal dismissed. 
324 U.S. 829, (1945), rehq. denied, 324 U.S. 891 (1945). 
The decision of how to proceed upon avoidable or unenforce-
able contract must necessarily be preserved to the principal 
rather than the guarantor. The Court's holding in Walcutt 
v. Clevite Corp. , 13 N.Y. 2d 48, 191 N.E.2d 894 (1963), estab-
lishes that a guarantor may not take upon himself the election of 
remedies which rightfully belong solely to the principal. The 
Court reasoned that by allowing the guarantor to interpose his 
principals' defense of fraud, the principal would effectively be 
deprived of his independent right to affirm or disaffirm the 
contract. This view has been recognized as early as 1917 in the 
case of Ettlinger v. National Surety Company, 221 N.Y. 467, 117 
N.E. 945 (1917), wherein the Court stated: 
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[W]hat shall be done with the contract 
induced by fraud is purely a question for the 
determination of the party on whom the fraud 
is committed. He may repudiate it, and if he 
does so the surety may avail himself of the 
repudiation . . . He may affirm it, in which 
case the surety cannot be heard to raise the 
question. He may suspend his action at least 
for a time, and the surety may not compel him 
to elect. 
117 N.E. at 946. 
The Court also adopted the following language: 
If the principal could abide by his contract, 
and the surety repudiate it, the strange 
result would be produced, that the principal 
would retain the fruits of its contract, 
while the surety would avoid the perfor-
mance of his obligation, on the ground of its 
validity, in direct opposition to the acts of 
its principal, admitting that the contract 
was valid. 
In the present case, Cheever, as an individual, attempted to 
affirmatively utilize the defense of fraud in an action to reform 
a guaranty agreement when the creditors had filed no cause of 
action either against the principal or the guarantor. To allow 
the Cheevers affirmative use of this defense could not only 
deprive Utah County Packing Company and Coles Brothers, Inc. of 
their rights to elect affirmance or disaffirmance of the purchase 
agreement, but also subjects, the Seethalers, to multiple suits, 
undue burden and hardship. Judicial economy dictates that 
disputes be resolved in an orderly and efficient manner. The 
rights of subrogation available to the guarantor in the event of 
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the principals1 default affords sufficient protection to the 
plaintiffs1 interest. More importantly, however, is the fact 
that the actions sought by the Cheevers is in direct opposition 
to the choice of remedies elected by Utah County Packing. 
Below, plaintiffs argued that if Utah County Packing had 
compromised its claims it cannot maintain an action. That, 
however, was the very reason for the rule. The defendants should 
not be subjected to multiple and contradictory actions and 
claims. Vernon Cheever's only right of action is by right of 
subrogation against Utah County Packing and Coles Brothers, Inc. 
Appellants would persuade the Court that when the alleged 
misrepresentations were made Mr. Cheevers was acting as both 
president of Utah County Packing Company and as a personal 
guarantor of the guaranty agreement. In one of plaintiff's 
documents submitted to the Court below, its response to defen-
dant's Trial Memorandum, (R. 474), the plaintiff set forth that 
Utah Packing Company compromised its claims of misrepresenta-
tions, yet, the plaintiff referred to an Affidavit as evidence of 
no such compromise by Vernon Cheever, individually. Such 
reasoning is inconsistent and supports the defendant's positions 
that any representations were, in fact, made to the plaintiff, 
Vernon Cheever, while he was wearing the hat of the company 
president. Thus, two situations came before the Court, either 
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Vernon Cheever acted both as president of Utah Packing Company 
and as personal guarantor throughout the negotiations, or Vernon 
Cheever acted as president of Utah County Packing Company during 
the negotiations and subsequently signed the guaranty under his 
capacity as a personal guarantor. 
Under the first situation, any compromise and settlement of 
Utah Packing Company claims of misrepresentation act as a merger 
of and bar of claims of Utah Packing Company, as well as Vernon 
Cheever, individually, as personal guarantor. Similarly, under 
the second situation, any representations were made exclusively 
to the president of Utah Packing Company, and the plaintiffs, as 
guarantors, are without standing to assert the claims or defenses 
of Utah Packing Company. 
Either situation supports the respondent's position that 
plaintiffs are without standing the bring the action. 
As set forth in arguments above, the only action that a 
guarantor might have independently for fraud, would be if he were 
induced to enter into an agreement of guaranty based upon 
fraudulent misrepresentations to him. It must be an indepen-
dent fraud affecting the guarantor separately and apart from the 
contention of fraud which the debtor could raise but does not. 
There is a dearth of authority for the proposition since it 
is so fundamental that no court has had to rule upon the subject; 
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however, there are now analogous cases. For example, in a suit 
wherein a seller of steel sought to recover from buyer's trade 
account guarantors, in the absence of any evidence the buyer's 
contract and purchase from the seller were inherently illegal or 
that enforcing collection of the purchase price for the product 
would be invoking the powers of the Court to aid in unlawful 
activity, the trial Court properly rejected the trade account 
guarantor's defense of alleged anti-trust violations by the 
seller. See Keene Corporation v. R. W. Taylor Steel Company, 594 
P.2d 889 (Utah 1979) . 
In Financial Corporation of America v. Prudential Carbon and 
Ribbon Company, 507 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1973). The point of the 
Court's decision in this case is that Wilkerson, the guarantor, 
could not raise a defense that had vested in the debtor. Fraud 
is a defense to the debtor and may be pleaded affirmatively; 
however, it is nothing more than a defense and may be waived. 
Since the debtor does not take advantage of the claim of fraud, 
the guarantor cannot 
The fallacy of appellant's position in this case is that the 
debtor may or may not have been injured or damaged by reason of 
the alleged fraud and the debtor may have reasons of its own why 
it did not raise fraud as a defense, and it does not behove this 
Court in this instance to substitute itself into what it presumes 
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to be the position of the debtor, and of course, the guarantor 
cannot bootstrap himself into the position of the debtor. 
The defects set forth above, that the plaintiffs have no 
standing to complain of any fraud that they claim to have 
occurred in the transaction between Seethalers, Inc., and Utah 
County Packing Company and Coles Brothers, Inc., and that the 
plaintiffs have failed to join parties necessary to this action, 
are jurisdictional defects that cannot be waived. As stated by 
the California Supreme Court in McKinny v. Oxnard Union Heights 
School District Board of Trusteef 31 Cal.3d 79, 180 
Cal. Rptr. 549, 642 P.2d 460 (1982): 
Defendants contend that plaintiffs do not 
have standing to maintain this action 
. . . it is elementary that a plaintiff who 
lacks standing cannot state a valid cause of 
action; therefore, a contention based upon a 
plaintiff's lack of standing cannot be waived 
. . . and may be raised at any time in the 
proceeding. 
642 P.2d at 465. The rule is the same where the plaintiff has 
failed to join the necessary and indispensable party. Jollev 
v. Puregro Company, 94 Id. 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972). 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT REACHING 
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD IN THAT THE CORPORATIONS 
WERE BARRED AND CHEEVER, AS AN INDIVIDUAL, COULD 
NOT SEEK A REMEDY IN CONTRAST TO THAT SOUGHT 
AS A CORPORATE OFFICER; IN ANY EVENT, WHERE 
A GUARANTOR EXERCISING PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE 
AS TO BUSINESS OPERATIONS INHERENT TO THE 
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CONTRACT, INSPECTS PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE CONTRACT, 
THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR APPLIES AND RELIANCE 
UPON THE OPINIONS OF THE SELLER ARE UNJUSTIFIED. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant, in his statements 
and opinions regarding the meat packing plant, had misrepresented 
its value, plaintiff's reliance thereon would still be unjusti-
fied. It is axiomatic that an element of fraud that must be 
proven is that a party acted reasonably when relying upon a 
representation and took reasonable steps to inform himself 
and to protect his own interest. 
It must be noted, that Mr. Cheever, as well as Mr. Coles, 
were experienced in the real estate business as evidenced by each 
having a realty sales and brokers license. The case of Tokarz 
v. Frontier Federal Savings & Loan, 34 Wash. App. 446, 656 P.2d 
1089 (1983) sets forth the applicable law: 
A party cannot be permitted to say he was 
taken advantage of, if he had the means of 
acquiring the information, or if, because of 
his business experience or his prior dealings 
with the other party, he should have acquired 
further information before he acted. 
656 P. 2d at 1094. It should also be noted that Mr. Cheever 
eagerly pursued the purchase involved and based on the experience 
of over two decades in the meat packing industry. 
The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is required 
to use his senses, and cannot recover if he blindly relies upon a 
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misrepresentation, the falsity of which would be patent to him 
if he had utilized his opportunity to make a cursory examination 
or investigation. The rule has been clearly stated as follows: 
Where the means of knowledge are at hand and 
equally available to both parties, and the 
subject of the purchase is alike open to 
their inspection, if the purchaser does not 
avail himself of these means and opportuni-
ties, he will not be heard to say that he has 
been deceived by the vendor's misrepresenta-
tions. If, having eyes, he will not see 
matters directly before them, where no 
concealment is made or attempted, he will not 
be entitled to favorable consideration when 
he complains that he has suffered from his 
own voluntary blindness and been mislead by 
over-confidence of another. 
Anstott v. Osborne, 417 P.2d 291 (Okl. 1966). Similarly, the 
Utah Supreme Court has stated as follows: 
The one who complains of being injured by 
such a false representation cannot heedlessly 
accept as true whatever is told him, but has 
the duty of exercising such degree of care to 
protect his own interest as would be exper-
ienced by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent 
person under the circumstances; and if he 
fails to do so, is precluded from holding 
someone else of the consequences of his own 
neglect. 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662 
(1967) . 
In the present action, Mr. Cheever, as well as his business 
partners, financial advisers and family visited the plant 
regularly. The employees at the meat packing plant were very 
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familiar with the visitors and knew many by name. Mr. Cheever, 
experienced in the trade of meat processing, was familiar with 
all of its operations, including the equipment, and was aware of 
the used nature of the equipment which was to be purchased. 
Skilled in the use of such equipment, Mr. Cheever knew of a 
constant need to maintain and repair used equipment. In fact, 
during such inspections, it would not be uncommon to observe the 
maintenance, repair and cleaning process inherent in the trade. 
Mr. Cheever had the duty to act reasonably and exercise due 
diligence in taking the necessary precautions against being 
deceived by those with whom he is bargaining. In view of 
Mr. Cheever!s experience as a licensed real estate agent, 
it would be improper for the Court disregard such peculiar 
intelligence and relieve such a party from the adverse effects of 
his freely bargained-for contract. 
There is no fraud where a vendor acts upon his own judgment 
rather than upon the representations made by the purchaser. This 
doctrine has received approval by a substantial majority of 
courts: 
[A]s a general rule, a purchaser making his 
own investigations, either in person or by 
his agent, which the vendor does not prevent 
from being as thorough as the vendee chooses 
to make them, cannot afterward allege that he 
relied upon the vendor's misrepresentation 
. . . If a purchaser makes a personal 
investigation which is free and unhampered 
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and the conditions are such that he must 
obtain the information that he desires, he is 
presumed to rely upon his own investigation 
rather than on representations made to him by 
his vendor. A purchaser of real property 
must be regarded as having relied upon his 
own judgment and not upon the representations 
of the vendor as to the value of the prem-
ises. So where, before entering into a 
contract . . . the purchaser or his agent 
makes an actual examination of the premises, 
it is held generally that such purchaser is 
precluded from having the contract rescinded 
upon the ground of falsity of 
representations. 
Where the buyer of personal property not only 
has an opportunity to ascertain the truth or 
falsity of the sellers representation with 
respect thereto, but instead of relying upon 
the representations, also actually makes or 
undertakes an investigation regarding them, 
it is generally held that he cannot avail 
himself with misrepresentations on the part 
of the seller, regardless of the result of 
the inquiry, if the seller does nothing 
to impede or frustrate the investigation. 
37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit, § 231 (1968) . 
Mr. Seethaler in no way restricted Mr. Cheever's access to 
the premises; indeed the plaintiff was allowed to have access to 
any and all information pertaining to the business. An indepen-
dent appraisal, performed at the request of Mr. Seethaler and is 
shown to the plaintiff, further evidences the plaintiff's free 
and unhindered access to the property. (R. 697-98). 
The doctrine or maxim "caveat emptor" expresses a general 
principle of law, both as to real and personal property. This 
doctrine means merely that they buyer of one acquiring property 
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through a business or commercial transaction must rely upon his 
own expertise in the purchase of such property. At present, the 
doctrine "caveat emptor" may be deemed to apply where the parties 
deal at arms length and the buyer investigates or inspects the 
subject the matter or has a full opportunity to do so. In Weil 
Clothing Company v. Glasser, 213, F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1954), the 
Court held that the maxim of "caveat emptor" applies whenever a 
purchaser has full opportunity to inspect what he is buying but 
fails to do so and relies upon mere statements of the seller 
which amount to know more than "puffing," "boasting," or the 
expressing of an opinion. 
Respondent contends that the trial court was correct in not 
even reaching the allegations of fraud in that the only parties 
who could allege fraud were the corporations and such were barred 
by the statute of limitations. The Trial Court was further 
correct that Cheever, as an individual, could not seek a remedy 
in contrast to that sought as a corporate officer. Furthermore, 
even if Cheever were allowed to bring an action in fraud as an 
individual, he was in the position to make his own judgment and 
his failure to rely on any of the alleged expressions of opinion 
of the seller were his risk assumed knowingly. 
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POINT VI 
EVEN WERE CHEEVER PERMITTED TO BRING A 
SEPARATE ACTION AS GUARANTOR, HIS ALLEGATION OF 
MISTAKE AS TO THE TRUST DEED FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR RESCISSION. 
Appellant contends that Vernon Cheever, in signing the Trust 
Deed and Trust Deed Note as guarantor failed to read the document 
and did not realize that he was securing the amount of 
$371,750.00. 
A mere glance through the pertinent document would indicate 
to anyone, uneducated or not in real estate, that they were 
securing the amount of $371,750.00. Mr. Cheever's claim of 
ignorance is even more incredible in view of the fact that he 
was a licensed realtor. 
It is well recognized that a guarantor's failure to read or 
understand a document he signed is not sufficient grounds for 
invalidation. 
[W]hen the guarantor seeks to avoid liability 
on his promise of guaranty basis that he did 
not understand the legal significance of the 
document in which he 
signed, the concept of objective mutual 
assent often preclude such a defense 
. . . [T]he present rules requires the 
guarantor to read, to inquire as to the facts 
which would be apparent to reasonable 
persons, and to understand the legal signifi-
cance of the document which he is signing. 
Any mistake which could have been corrected 
by due diligence and which is not the 
result of imposition practiced on the 
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guarantor by the creditor is not a basis for 
rescinding the guaranty contract if the 
creditor reasonably relied on the promise of 
the guarantor. 
38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 56 (1983). The Utah Supreme Court in 
Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Utah 1981) 
stated, "the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the 
content of the instrument itself . . . " The Court in Hotel 
Riviera, Inc. v. Torres, 97 Nev. 399, 632 P.2d 1155 (1981), 
adopted the following language: 
The making of a contract depends not on the 
agreement of two minds and one intention, but 
on the agreement of two sets of external 
signs — not on the parties' having met one 
thing but on their having said one thing. 
It has been held, "if the signer could read the instrument, 
not to have read it is gross negligence; if he could not read 
it, not to have it read to him is equally negligent; in either 
case, the writing binds him." Azrak v. Manufacturer's Trust 
Company, 120 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953). 
Appellant, in its first cause of action asked the Court to 
reform the $371,750.00 Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note to become a 
second trust deed for only $25,000.00. The plaintiff therein 
failed to even allege a prima facie case for reformation. 
To state a cause of action for reformation, the plaintiff 
must at least allege either (1) mutual mistake or (2) "ignorance 
or mistake of a complaining party coupled with or induced by the 
36 
fraud or inequitable conduct of the other remaining parties." 66 
Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instrument, § 12 (1973) as quoted 
in Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1980). 
The Cheevers have not alleged any mutual mistake. There is 
no claim that Mr. and Mrs. Seethaler were mistaken as to the 
meaning of the documents which were signed. 
Cheevers have similarly failed to allege fraud of the type 
contemplated by this rule. An example of this type of fraud 
would be if Mr. Seethaler had handed the Trust Deed to 
Mr. Cheever and said "this is a $25,000.00 Trust Deed." There 
is not even an allegation of actionable fraud going to the 
signing of the document. 
An allegation that Mr. Seethaler fraudulently induced 
Mr. Cheever to sign the documents by misrepresenting the quality 
of the meat packing business, is not a type of fraud which will 
support a cause of action for reformation. The Cheevers have 
erroneously urged the Court to rewrite an unambiguous instrument. 
In sum, even if Cheever were permitted to bring a separate 
action as guarantor, in his allegation of mistake as to the Trust 




RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES 
BY REASON OF APPELLANTS1 FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, if the Court determines that an appeal taken is 
frivolous, it can award just damages of single or double costs, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. 
It is respondent's contention that the appeal undertaken by 
the appellants was unnecessary and frivolous. 
In appellant's brief, he states that "the case is the most 
protracted and ludicrous lawsuit in which there have been at 
least three trial settings and the filing of 825 paginated pages 
. . ." (Appellant's Brief Page 4). The proceeding below was 
rather extensive prior to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
only because the Court allowed the plaintiff to amend his 
Complaint three times in attempt to state a cause of action, and 
because after each hearing the Court allowed the plaintiff to 
re-brief the legal questions, and only because the Court thor-
oughly considered every issue before granting defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Further, the plaintiff, as pointed out, 
was allowed to file enumerable pleadings all of which were 
without merit. The last pleading, (March 1985) was to enjoin 
the sale of the pledged property. Their motion was filed in 
duplicate in the Supreme Court and the District Court without 
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notice of the contemporaneous filing to either Court. Both 
Courts denied the motion, but the trial court granted the 
defendant $3 00.00 attorney fees for responding to a petition 
after the Court had lost jurisdiction and because the prayer for 
relief was frivolous. The same is true of the appeal and the 
plaintiffs are entitled to attorney fees. The Court below 
committed no error of law and after repeated opportunities to 
present its case, plaintiff simply failed to state a cause of 
action upon which relief could be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court below allowed the plaintiffs to amend and revise 
their Complaint three times in an effort to give them every 
opportunity to state a cause of action upon which relief could be 
granted. Upon filing the original Complaint the defendants moved 
to dismiss and the Court allowed for briefs and argument. The 
plaintiffs amended their Complaint and the defendants renewed 
their Motion to Dismiss. The Court allowed for briefs and 
arguments. The plaintiffs amended their Complaint again and the 
defendants moved to dismiss. This time the Court denied defen-
dants1 Motion. Subsequently, the defendants moved to dismiss for 
plaintiffs1 failure to join a necessary and indispensible party. 
The Court allowed for briefs and argument. After two additional 
conferences the Court dismissed the case but allowed the plain-
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tiffs to once again amend. Upon the filing of the plaintiffs1 
fourth Complaint, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The 
Court stated its inclination to rule on the Motion in favor of 
defendants but once again allowed for briefs and arguments before 
entering the ruling. The Court then ruled in favor of the 
defendants but allowed for additional briefing. Upon entry of 
the ruling, the plaintiff challenged the ruling and Minute Entry 
and, amazingly, the Court allowed plaintiffs to submit yet 
another brief. Finally, the Court ruled against plaintiffs and 
granted defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Clearly the trial court went to great lengths to consider 
every possible aspect of the litigation and made an enormous 
effort to afford plaintiffs every opportunity to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted. 
The trial court was correct in ruling that Cheever did not 
have a cause of action as guarantor and the statute of limita-
tions had run against the corporations. The trial court was 
further correct in ruling that any alleged fraud was committed 
upon both the principal, Utah County Packing and the guarantor, 
Cheever and that Utah County Packing affirmed the contract, thus 
Cheever was estopped from asserting the alleged fraud, having 
elected his remedies. 
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The respondents seek affirmation of the trial court's ruling 
and seek attorney fees for appellants' frivolous appeal. 
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